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0Abstract
By bureaucratic institutions or bureaucracy, we mean the rules and regula-
tions that areimplemented by government agencies. Burdensome bureaucratic
institutions are leading obstacles to economic development and therefore the
target of economic reform of many countries in today's world. In this paper,
we providea theoretical framework to analyzethe reform of bureaucratic insti-
tutions. Theanalysis shows the key to the reform is to properly incentivize the
incumbent generation of bureaucrats, whose cooperation is needed to reform
the bureaucracy. However, a simplebuy out strategy of reform may not always
work. Under certain conditions, a delegation strategy that grants incumbent
bureaucrats the decision rights to initiateand to reap the bene¯t of reform can
be successful.
JEL Classi¯cation Code: D72, P21, P, O12.
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11. Introduction
By bureaucratic institutions or bureaucracy, we refer to the formal and informal
rules and regulations that government agencies implement. Examples are the reg-
ulations that certain businesses have to be approved by some government agencies
before they can operate. Excessive and burdensome bureaucratic institutions are
the leading factor that hampers economic development in many countries. In fact,
the post-socialist transition that is undertaken in many countries covering a third of
the world population today is in essence a massive reform aiming at reducing the
bureaucratic institutions in these economies.
While much has been written about the ine±ciencies of bureaucratic institutions
and the necessity for massive reforms of the bureaucracy, there has been few works
on how to induce changes in bureaucratic institutions.2 This leaves many interesting
questions unanswered. For example, what are the di±culties of reforming bureau-
cratic institutions? Given that reforms, by de¯nition, are welfare improving, why is
it that simple buy-out plans of bureaucrats do not always work? Why is it that we
often observe a surge of corruption of bureaucrats during economic reforms whose
very aim is to reduce the in°uence of bureaucracy?
The ¯rst intended contribution of this paper is to provide a simple theoretical
framework to understand the bureaucracy and the reform of it. Bureaucracy, we ar-
gue, is sustained by over-lapping generations of bureaucrats. Knowledge and decision
rights (power) are transferred from one generation of bureaucrats to another. Given
this structure of the bureaucracy, there are two kinds of ine±ciencies in a bureau-
cracy. The ¯rst ine±ciency arises because self-interest bureaucrats abuse their power
2For example, Kornai's (1992) comprehensive analysis of the formerly socialist systems exposes
how bureaucratic control leads to various economic problems in these economies.
2to regulation economic activities by taking bribes from private agents. The second
ine±ciency is that the bureaucrats in power do not typically promote the ablest suc-
cessors within their agencies. Instead, they take bribes before making the succession
decision. Both ine±ciencies can be termed as the agency problems of the bureau-
cracy, since they stem from the bureaucrats' self-interest divergent from that of the
bureaucracy as a whole.
Based on the analytical framework, we are able to examine the reform of the
bureaucracy. A reform, rather than a revolution, is initiated by the top leadership
aiming to restructure the bureaucracy in order to improve the e±ciency of the econ-
omy. Under the reform, many bureaucratic agencies must be eliminated, while other
agencies need to be restructured to provide useful services for private agents (e.g.,
investors) in the economy. Therefore, the top leadership would prefer not to simply
close all o±ces indiscriminately. But the top leadership needs cooperation of bu-
reaucrats in order to reform. While there are many reasons why their cooperation
is needed, our model focuses on one in particular: information imperfection. In our
model, the leadership is unable to observe directly the productivity of o±ces and
discern which o±ces should be closed and which are to be restructured.
A general conclusion of the analysis is that the key to reform the bureaucracy is to
properly deal with the current generation of bureaucrats in power, whose cooperation
is needed in order to break or to change the chain of succession of bureaucrats. We
show that a one-time buy-out strategy of the bureaucrats in power to induce them
to close their agency may not always work. The reason is that in many cases, it
is important to induce e®orts of some bureaucrats to restructure their agencies. In
this case, the buy-out strategy causes many bureaucrats who should pay e®orts to
restructure their agencies to close them instead.
The focus of our analysis is on a delegation strategy of reform, i.e., to grant bu-
3reaucratsthe rights to reform andto reap thebene¯tof reform. It is adecentralization
approach to reform as observed in many countries. By giving bureaucrats the rights
to initiate a reform and at the same time, loosening monitoring of the bureaucrats,
such a reform induces bureaucrats to either close their agency or to restructure it.
By making the socially e±cient choice, bureaucrats can obtain higher bribes from
investors who expect to face reformed bureaucracy. The cost to them is that they
either have to pay e®orts to restructure the agency or, in the case of closing the
agency, lose bribes from young generations of bureaucrats that they normally obtain.
Under the condition that the pre-reform, the bureaucracy was tightly monitored, so
that the increase in payo® to bureaucrats associated with the delegation strategy is
high, such a strategy of reform may be successful.
An implication of the analysis is an explanation of the observation that in many
countries undergoing reforms of the their bureaucracy, there is a surge in corruption
juxtaposed with rapid reform. According to our theory, this is due to the delegation
strategy of reform that is a common element of reforms in many countries, where the
top reformist leadership does not have strong enough political capital and detailed
knowledge to dictate details of the reform. Delegating the rights of reform to local
bureaucrats becomes a natural choice. This explanation of corruption during reform
is in contrast to existing theories, which all focus on corruption in static and stable
bureaucracies. Their main conclusion is that corruption impedes economic growth.3
3See Rose-Ackerman (1975), Rose-Ackerman (1978), Gould and Amaro-Reyes (1983), Lui (1985),
United Nations (1989), and Klitgaard (1991), Shleifer and Vishny (1993) for arguments along this
line. Mauro (1995) and Wei (1997) provide empirical support on this view by conducting mostly
cross-country analysis. Le® (1964) represents a minority view arguing that moderate corruption
can improve e±ciency. Bardhan (1997) provides a recent survey of existing literature. Recently,
Acemoglu and Verdier (1994) and Banerjee (1994) present careful models on how corruption and
associated ine±ciency arise. But it seems to us that there have been few e®orts addressing corruption
4In the next two sections, we provide a model of bureaucratic institutions and then
analyze the conditions under which the buy-out strategy works. The focus is on the
delegation strategy of reform. In section 4, we discuss the results and extend the
basic model along several dimensions. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. The Model
2.1. Three Classes of Agents
There are three classes of agents in the model. The ¯rst class is the top leadership,
denoted by T. Given that the focus of our analysis is on the reform of the ine±ciency
of the bureaucracy, we assume that T is a \good person," who is interested in maxi-
mizing social welfare through a successful reform. This approach is partly supported
by the observation that unlike career bureaucrats, T is subject to direct monitoring
by the general public through democratic election and therefore is more likely to have
aligned interest with the general public.
Thesecondclass of agents comprises overlappinggenerations of bureaucrats. Each
bureaucrat lives for two periods: ¯rst as an \apprentice" of an o±ce and then the
\chief" of the o±ce when he obtains the full control right ofthe o±ce. Let Bt indicate
the bureaucrat who is in control in period t. Bt's economic life starts at the beginning
of period t¡ 1.
Entrepreneurs comprise the third class of agents. Like bureaucrats, there are also
overlapping generations of entrepreneurs. Let Et be an entrepreneur born at time
t. Without losing generality, we assume that neither bureaucrats nor entrepreneurs
in the context of institutional change.
5discount future utilities.
2.2. Entrepreneurs' Investment
Et makes an investment k at the beginning of period t and the investment pays
o® stochastically at the end of periods t and t + 1. At each time of payo®, with
probability ¹(ki), the gross payo® is R, a constant; otherwise it is 0. In other words,
the investment k is intended to increase the chance of success of the investment rather
than the conditional payo®. We make the assumption that k only a®ects ¹ but not
R in order to accentuate the damage of a bad bureaucracy on investment incentives
of entrepreneurs. Given this assumption, k is not observable and deductible from
output R so that bribes or taxes are contingent on gross output R and are directly
incentive-reducing.
We will maintain the following technical assumptions:
Assumption 1: ¹(0) = 0, ¹0(0) = 1, ¹0(k) > 0, and ¹00(k) < 0.
It turns out that the most interesting case in our analysis is where the proba-
bility function ¹ is highly concave, i.e., having rather rapidly decreasing returns to
investment. Consequently, we will maintain the following assumptions:
Assumption 2: ¡
¹0(k)
¹00(k) is a decreasing function of k.
2.3. Agency Problems within the Bureaucracy
By agency problems within the bureaucracy, we mean that bureaucrats do not
share the objectives of the top leadership T, the principal of the bureaucracy. More-
over, since T cannot fully observe activities of bureaucrats, the bureaucrats tend to
engage in activities damaging the interest of T. We speci¯cally model two types of
agency problems. The ¯rst type arises because Bt is in control of the o±ce and there-
fore canprevent both Et¡1 and Et from reapingthe return ontheir investments. That
6is, bribery from entrepreneurs to bureaucrats arises. For simplicity, we will assume
that the bureaucrat can make a take-it-or-leave-it o®er in negotiating the amount of
the bribe.
To control this type of agency cost, T employs random and direct monitoring of
the bureaucrats. We model a very simple monitoring technology. At the end of each
period, with probability q0, T investigates whether Bt has taken a bribe. If Bt is
found to have taken a bribe b, he will have to pay a ¯ne of F(b). We assume that
the ¯ne function is F(b) = b2. The simple functional form should not change our
main conclusions in any qualitative way. At the end of period, the ¯ne is rebated in
a lump-sum fashion to the entire population.4 nder such an anti-corruption policy,
Bt chooses to maximize b¡q0b2, so the optimal bribe Bt demands is b =
1
2q0 and the
associated payo® to Bt is b = 1
4q0
Throughout our analysis, we shall assume that T0s direct monitoring forms a
binding constraint on the amount of the bribe. That is, the total net pro¯t is bigger
than the bribe so that it is worthwhile for the entrepreneur to bribe the bureaucrat.
Also, for our analysis, we shall assume that q0 is the exogenous steady state intensity
of direct monitoring. For technical convenience, we shall focus on changes in q0 rather
than changes in F(:). To summarize, in the following discussions involving q, we have
Assumption 3: R > 1
2q.
The second kind of agency problem is called nepotism, which arises because a
senior bureaucrat has power to choose his successor and aspiring junior o±cials have
to compete for the position.5 Therefore, we assume that before Bt+1 inherits power
4We assume that the ¯ne is evenly distributed among all agents, so that there are no incentive
consequences. We can allow the ¯ne to be paid back to the investing entrepreneur without any
qualitative changes in the following analysis.
5In our model, for simplicity, we assume away competition among junior bureaucrats. In general,
7from Bt, he has pay a \tribute" to the old.
Avoiding the details of modeling nepotism, we simply assume that the \tribute" is
a constant (®) proportion of the junior o±cial's expected future bribe. The \tribute"
is a perk enjoyed by the senior o±cial. Since it is unlikely that there are well-
functioning capital markets to ¯nance junior bureaucrats' pursuit for future power,
® is likely to be much less than 1.
2.4. The Steady State of the Bureaucracy
We can now analyze the steady state the bureaucracy, i.e., the situation without
reform. The conclusion is consistent with conventional wisdom. That is, a tighter
monitoring of bureaucrats improves the e±ciency of the bureaucracy and social wel-
fare. The intuition is that bribes to bureaucrats siphon o® returns to entrepreneurs,
who then have less incentive to invest.
From our previous analysis, Et has to bribe Bt in period t and then Bt+1 in period





Consequently, Bt expects to get a payo® of b ¡ q0b2 = 1
4q0 with probability ¹ and 0
otherwise from each project and there are two projects existing during Bt's reign of
the o±ce.
How much will Et invest? Et will maximize her expected return, which is
2¹(k)(R¡ b) ¡ k;
since she does not discount the second period payo®.
such competition can be important.




) = 1: (2)
Notice that given the existence of the bureaucratic o±ce, the expected social
welfare from investment k is
2¹R¡ k
which requires that the ¯rst best investment level satisfy
2¹
0(k)R = 1: (3)
Comparing equations (2) and (3), we conclude:
Proposition 1 Given the existence of bureaucratic o±ces, a higher q0 leads to higher
investment, higher output, and higher social welfare.
Can a tighter monitoring policy of the bureaucracy be Pareto improving, so that
both bureaucrats and entrepreneurs prefer tighter anti-corruption policies? In the
real world the answer is likely to be no, since otherwise popular political demand
should have already produced stricter policies. In our model, however, the answer
may be yes. The intuition is that an increase in q may increase k so much that the
higher success rate ¹ leads to more frequent bribes, which more than compensates for
the lower amount of each bribe. It turns out that this situation does not arise when
q is not too low. Assumption 5 rules out this unlikely case. We shall maintain this
assumption for the remainder of the paper.
Assumption 5: q ¸
¹03
¡¹¹00, for k > 0:
Lemma 1 Under Assumptions 1 to 5, an increase in q0 makes the entrepreneur better




6The second order condition is guaranteed by our convexity assumption on ¹:
93. Strategies of Reform
Suppose that at t = 0, a reformist leader T assumes power. The intended market-
oriented reform involves changing the role of the bureaucracy.7 We identify two
general objectives of such a reform: to eliminate those unproductive bureaucratic
o±ces and to restructure those potentially productive ones. Correspondingly, suppose
there are two types of o±ces. The ¯rst type o±ce does not provide any value-added
to investment projects as modeled above and cannot be restructured. This will be
called the low type o±ce and the reform intends to close such o±ces. The second
type can be restructured during a reform so that with the service of the o±ce, the
positive return to an investment becomes Rv with v > 1. Restructuring such o±ces
requires e®orts of a bureaucrat equivalent to a monetary cost c. Let us call this the
high type o±ce.
The model is concerned with a fundamental di±culty of reform, i.e. the top
reformer does not have su±cient political and administrative capacity to implement
a reform. To analyze this di±culty of reform, we focus on the issue of information.
Suppose that T cannot distinguish between the two types of o±ces and cannot force
a bureaucrat to make e®orts to restructure. T only knows that a certain proportion
of o±ces are of the high type.8 Furthermore, suppose T has limited capacity so that
he cannot observe the output of each o±ce.
Facing limited capacity, in general, T can adopt one of two broad approaches to
7As Kornai (1992) argues, bureaucratic coordination is a key feature of many non-market
economies.
8This informational asymmetry is our way of formalizing why T needs bureaucratic cooperation
during reform. See section 5.1. for other reasons why this might be true.
10reform. He canorder thebureaucrats tocloseall o±ces withoutany restructuring. We
call this a sweeping reform. Alternatively, he can provide incentives for bureaucrats
and delegate the rights to reform to them. We call this a decentralized reform. In
the following, we discuss strategies to implement a decentralized reform.
3.1. Buying Out Bureaucrats
A simple strategy to implement a decentralized reform is to buy out bureaucrats.
In such a strategy, T compensates bureaucrats who choose to close their o±ces im-
mediately. We show that such a buy-out strategy may or may not induce a successful
decentralized reform. Suppose that the monetary compensation is m. In order for a










wherek0 is the amount of investment de¯nedinequation (2), since without closing
the o±ce, B0 expects to get bribes from E¡1, E0, and B1.
Meanwhile, in order for the buy-out strategy to be successful, m cannot be too












where the ¯rst term is the expected bribe from E¡1 and the second term is that







11Clearly when c is non-trivial, both conditions cannot be satis¯ed simultaneously.
Proposition 2 If c < (1 + 2®)
¹(kH)¡¹(k0)
4q0 , then a buy-out strategy that o®ers m to
those bureaucrats who decide to close their o±ces will induce a successful decentralized






4q0 ¡ c ).
In addition to the condition speci¯ed above, there are other constraints that may
prevent a buy-out strategy from being feasible. In particular, T is likely to face a
tight budget constraint during the reform period so that he does not have the funds
to buy out B0's. Furthermore, even if T can borrow against future tax raises in order
to ¯nance the buy-out strategy, the taxes will fall on future productive investors and
this may not be desirable.
3.2. The Delegation of Rights to Reform
An important approach to reform is through delegating the rights to reform to
bureaucrats in charge of bureaucratic agencies, i.e., to grant individual bureaucrats
the decision rights to reform and to reap the bene¯t of reform. Such a reform strategy
is di®erent from that of a sweeping reform in which the top leaders issue a mandate
to close or to restructure bureaucratic agencies.
A key component of the delegation strategy of reform is to grant bureaucrats
rights to bene¯t from reform. In order to do so, the monitoring policy within the
bureaucracy must be relaxed. Suppose that the monitoring policy is relaxed from q0
to q¤ for period 0andbureaucrats aregranted autonomy toinitiate reforms, i.e., either
to close or to restructure their o±ces. Let us analyze the decisions of bureaucrats in
each type of o±ce.
For a B0 in a low type o±ce, without reform (i.e., he keeps the o±ce open), he












where the ¯rst term in square brackets is the sum of bribes B0 obtains from E¡1
and E0; the second term is the \tribute" paid by the young bureaucrat; k¤ is the







Alternatively, if B0 chooses to reform (i.e., to close the o±ce), he will bene¯t from
higher bribes due to higher investments but will lose the \tribute" from B1 who will












Apparently, kc > k0 > k¤. Therefore, in order to induce B0 in the low type o±ce









which means that the increase in current bribe due to higher investment associ-
ated with reform should o®-set the loss of \tribute" from the young generation of
bureaucrat.
13For a bureaucrat in a high type o±ce, he has three choices: close the o±ce, keep
the o±ce open without restructuring, and keep the o±ce open with restructuring.
Apparently, the choice between the ¯rst two is the same as that analyzed above.
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Therefore, under the condition that a B0 in a low type o±ce decides to close









] > c: (8)
Therefore, we have:
Proposition 3 The necessary and su±cient conditions for a delegation strategy of

















] > c: (8)
14where kc and kH are investments by E1 when the o±ce is closed and restructured,
respectively; k¤ and kR are the investments made by E0 anticipating the low type
o±ce to stay open and the high type o±ce to be restructured, respectively.
We can obtain several comparative static results from Proposition 3. Consider a
decrease in q¤. Both investments kc and k¤ will be lower, resulting in an ambiguous
e®ect on whether B0 in a low type o±ce chooses to close the o±ce. However, with
the lower q¤, B0 can bene¯t even more from the di®erence between kc and k¤, since
in e®ect, a more relaxed control of corruption means he is given a larger share in the
e±ciency improvement. Overall, we show that last factor dominates the ambiguity
of the ¯rst e®ect.
Similarly, consider the implication of anincrease inq0 for condition (6), the steady
state anti-corruption policy. The ¯rst e®ect is that k¤ is higher, since E0 expects to
pay fewer bribes to B1 in period 1. The higher k¤ means that B0 has more bribes in
period 0 and creates a stronger incentive for a B0 in a low type o±ce not to reform.
However, from Lemma 1, a higher q0 also means that B1 obtains less expected bribes.
This translates into a lower \tribute" paid to B0. We can show that under certain
conditions, the second e®ect dominates the ¯rst.
Corollary 1 Ceteris Paribus, 1) a lower q¤ makes the delegation strategy of reform
more likely to be successful. 2) When ® is su±ciently large and c su±ciently small,
a higher q0 makes the co-opting strategy more likely to be successful. 3) When c is
su±ciently small, a smaller ® favors the success of the delegation strategy of reform.
We can also study the consequence of a successful delegation strategy of reform.
If a reform based on the above co-opting strategy is successful, then a bureaucrat
in the low type o±ce expects to get more bribes than before the reform. However,
15compared with the pre-reform situation, the investment level in the low type o±ce
will increase, since entrepreneurs expect that their o±ces will be closed. After the
reform, the investment level will increase further due to the ¯nal elimination of the
low type o±ce. By the same argument, bureaucrats in the high type o±ce will also
get higher bribes and the investment level in their o±ce will also increase during the
reform and will increase further when the reform is successful and the anti-corruption
policy is tightened.
Proposition 4 During the implementation of a successful delegation strategy of re-
form, the amount of expected payo® to bureaucrats in both types of o±ces goes up. The
level of investments in both o±ces will increase during reform and increases further
after the reform.
4. Extensions and Discussion
4.1. The Need for Bureaucratic Cooperation during the Reform
In our formal model, a key assumption is the information asymmetry between
the reformist T and the incumbent bureaucrats B0. This asymmetry makes the
cooperation of bureaucrats important. In fact, our formal analysis can be extended
to a much wider range of circumstances. What is essential to our theory is the
premise that the cooperation of lower-level bureaucrats is very important if one is to
implement signi¯cant institutional change.
There are two broad categories of reasons why bureaucratic cooperationis needed.
The obvious one is that bureaucratic skills are often indispensable for institutional
changes. Many reform measures have to be implemented by lower-level bureaucrats.
Take the issue of mass privatization. All detailed operations, from checking book
16values of state enterprises and issuing vouchers to organizing auctions of shares, have
to be performed by the bureaucrats. Aside from incentive issues, the incumbent
industrial bureau o±cials are the least costly human resources for these tasks. In
general, such bureaucratic capital is a resource that can be utilized e±ciently by the
reformers.
The second reason for the importance of bureaucratic cooperation during the
reform is based on the top reformers limited political capital. The top reformer must
amass a critical amount of political support for the reform. Incumbent bureaucrats,
through their familiarity with politics, are potentially formidable foes of reform who
need to be placated.
4.2. The Political Cost of the Delegation Strategy of Reform
Our formal analysis omits any discussion of the political cost of the delegation
strategy of reform. Our theory focuses on the economic costs of such strategies in
the form of decreased incentives for entrepreneurs to invest. However, there are
also signi¯cant political costs. In a delegation strategy, bureaucrats getting \golden
handshakes" seem like a vestige of the past, and a counterexample to what reforming
politicians usually preach. The presence of such examples can create public cynicism
and dissatisfaction with the reform process. For instance, in China, corruption was
a leading cause of the Tienanmen incident. In other formerly socialist economies,
corruption was often regarded as a \second-generation" problem of transition.9
It seems that the marginal political cost of corruption associatedwith a delegation
strategy of reform increases very fast with the level of corruption. Mild levels of
corruption can be easily tolerated by the general public so long as the economy grows
fast. Extremely high levels of corruption even in rapidly growing economies can lead
9See Transition, June, 1995.
17to extreme political responses, from votingout the government tomilitary coup d'etat.
This leads us to believe that our theory is more relevant to cases where corruption
levels are low before the reform and a mild increase of corruption is enough to provide
the incentives for bureaucrats to comply with the reform.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we theorize the reform of the bureaucracy. The theory emphasizes
the di®erence between the bureaucracy and individual bureaucrats. The bureau-
cracy is sustained by overlapping generations of bureaucrats, while the bureaucrats,
like managers of modern corporations, have interests diverse from that of the bureau-
cracy. Thus, agency problems exist within the bureaucracy. The key to reforming the
bureaucracy is to incentivize the incumbent bureaucrats either to close or to restruc-
ture their agencies. In this regard, the reform of the bureaucracy is like a long-term
investment. The one-time cost is that associated with dealing with the incumbent
bureaucrats. The bene¯t is from better institutions that last for generations.
Using this simple framework, we analyze various strategies of reform of the bu-
reaucracy. The focus is on a delegation strategy that grants incumbent bureaucrats
the decision rights to initiate and to bene¯t from reform. It involves a temporary re-
laxation of monitoring of bureaucrats. Under certain conditions such a decentralized
strategy of reform can be successful. An implication of the analysis is an explanation
of why in many countries, a surge in corruption co-exists with reforms. Corruption in
these cases is a result of loosened control of bureaucrats upon whom the autonomy of
reform is granted. This explanationis in contrast to conventional views of corruption,
18which are concerned with only static bureaucracy rather then the reform of it.
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The last inequality is from Assumption 5.









@® < 0. Therefore, a lower ® makes the co-opting strategy more likely.
For an increase in q¤, we know that ¹(k¤) will be higher, since k¤ will be higher.
kL is independent of q¤. Therefore, the second term in D will be higher. As for the























19The last inequality is by assumption 2.
Finally, we can study the e®ect of a change in q0 on D: The only terms a®ected




q0 . kL increases with an increase in q0 by Proposition
1. At the same time, the second term decreases with an increase in q0 by Lemma 1.
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which gives the condition in Corollary 1.
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